Abstract: Arrow's "impossibility" and similar classical theorems are usually proved for an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. Recent work extends Arrow's theorem to various restricted but "saturating" domains of privately oriented, continuous, (strictly) convex, and (strictly) monotone "economic preferences" for private and/or public goods. For strongly saturating domains of more general utility profiles, this paper provides similar extensions of Wilson's theorem and of the strong and weak "welfarism" results due to d'Aspremont and Gevers and to Roberts. Hence, for social welfare functionals with or without interpersonal comparisons of utility, most previous classification results in social choice theory apply equally to strongly saturating economic domains.
Introduction and Outline
As far as the welfare economist is concerned, the main task of social choice theory is to aggregate measures of welfare for each individual into a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. Ideally, such aggregation should satisfy the Pareto condition (P) and some appropriate form of the independence (of irrelevant alternatives) condition (I). It has also been usual to impose condition (U), requiring that there be an unrestricted domain of individual preference profiles. Then, without interpersonal comparisons, Arrow's well known impossibility theorem shows that this aggregation requires a dictatorship. Sen (1970) extended Arrow's result to allow cardinal utility functions. In some sense, interpersonal comparisons are even needed in order to choose the dictator. Also, Wilson's (1972) interesting generalization of Arrow's theorem shows that, when condition (P) is weakened to a particular "weak non-imposition" condition (WNI), then unless the social welfare functional always leads to universal social indifference, there must be either a dictator or an inverse dictator.
1
Interpersonal comparisons allow a much richer range of possibilities. Nevertheless, suppose that a social welfare functional (SWFL) satisfies conditions (U) and (I), both revised in an obvious way as stated in Hammond (1976 , 1991 ), d'Aspremont and Gevers (1977 and Roberts (1980) so that the new conditions apply to profiles of utility functions which may be interpersonally comparable. Suppose too that the Pareto indifference condition (P 0 ) is satisfied. Then the important "strong neutrality" result due to d'Aspremont and Gevers (1977, Lemmas 2 and 3), Sen (1977) and d'Aspremont (1985, Theorem 2.3, p. 34) implies the existence of a "welfarist" preference ordering. This ordering is defined on the finite dimensional Euclidean space of vectors of utility levels and represents the social welfare functional in an obvious way. Alternatively, provided that both condition (P) and a weak form of continuity are satisfied, there is another important "weak neutrality" result due to Roberts (1980, Theorem 1, p. 428) . Subject to a minor correction discussed in Hammond (1999) and in Section 3 below, this result shows that the social preference ordering has 1 Wilson (1972) also explores the implications of abandoning even condition (WNI) and retaining only conditions (U) and (I). It would be fairly easy but not especially enlightening to extend the results of this paper for saturating domains in the same way. a one-way "weak welfarist" representation by a continuous and weakly monotonic realvalued function of individual utility levels -that is, whenever this "Roberts social welfare function" (or RSWF) increases, the social state must be preferred.
In their original forms, all these theorems required there to be an unrestricted domain of individual preference orderings or utility functions, respectively. Yet welfare economics typically makes use of a Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function defined on a space of economic allocations. Then it is natural to consider only "economically relevant" preferences or utility functions for economic allocations. In fact, it is usual to assume that each individual's preferences are "privately oriented" in the sense of being indifferent to changes in other individuals' allocations of private goods. And to assume that each individual's preferences are at least weakly monotone as regards combinations of their own private goods with public goods. In the extreme case when there is no public good and only one private good, as in pure "cake division" problems, this implies that there must be a unique profile of individual preferences.
Despite this evident violation of condition (U), important later work has extended
Arrow's impossibility theorem to different restricted domains of economically relevant preferences. See, for example, Kalai, Muller and Satterthwaite (1979) , Gibbard, Hylland and Weymark (1987) , Donaldson and Weymark (1988) , Le Breton (1989, 1990a, b) , Campbell (1989b) , Redekop (1990 Redekop ( , 1993a Redekop ( , b, 1995 , Le Breton and Weymark (1996) , and Le Breton (1997) . In particular, various kinds of "saturating" domain are rich enough for Arrow's theorem to hold.
The main purpose of this paper is to find similar extensions of the fundamental neutrality or welfarism theorems due to d'Aspremont and Gevers and to Roberts. 2 We shall also extend Wilson's theorem in the same direction, following the work of Bordes and Le Breton (1989) for the case of an economic domain with only private goods -see also Campbell (1989a) . 3 These three extensions are more straightforward, however, if one first considers a more general, restricted, but "strongly saturating" domain of individual utility function profiles, not necessarily just a domain that arises in familiar economic environments.
One way to prove our results would be to check that each step of the original proofs by Arrow, Wilson, d'Aspremont and Gevers, and Roberts remains valid even in the relevant restricted domain. Our approach, by contrast, follows the technique pioneered by Kalai, Muller and Satterthwaite (1979) . This involves applying the standard results for unrestricted domains locally to "free triples." The global result is then established by connecting "non-trivial" pairs of social states through chains of overlapping free triples, and invoking the independence axiom; special arguments are also needed to treat trivial pairs which, by definition, cannot be included in any free triple.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the basic framework and definitions, followed in section 3 by the three main theorems. Section 4 contains proofs.
Finally, section 5 considers adaptations of our results to treat three different economic environments: the first has only public goods and a common domain of individual preferences;
the second has only private goods and individual preferences which depend only on their own consumption; and the third allows both private and public goods. The only previous results for this important third case appear in Bordes and Le Breton's (1990a) presentation of Arrow's theorem.
A brief appendix sets out a lemma, based on arguments due to Sen (1970) and to d' Aspremont and Gevers (1977) , showing that cardinal non-comparability of individuals' utility functions implies ordinal non-comparability when conditions (U) and (I) are satisfied.
Definitions and Notation
Suppose that there is a society described by a finite set N of individuals, with typical member i. Let Z be the underlying set of all possible social states. Given any S ⊂ Z, let U(S) and R(S) respectively denote the domain of all possible utility functions U : S → R and all possible (reflexive, complete and transitive) preference orderings R on S.
For each individual i ∈ N and each S ⊂ Z, let U i (S) and R i (S) be copies of U(S) and R(S) respectively. The two Cartesian product sets U N (S) := i∈N U i (S) and R N (S) := i∈N R i (S) consist of all possible utility profiles and preference profiles respectively. Given any utility function U ∈ U(Z), let ψ(U ) ∈ R(Z) denote the corresponding preference ordering represented by U . Given any utility profile
is the associated restricted domain of allowable preference profiles.
For each individual i ∈ N , let D i := proj i D N and R i := ψ i (D i ) denote the associated domains of i's allowable utility functions and preference orderings, respectively.
Following Sen (1970 Sen ( , 1977 , assume that there is a social welfare functional (or SWFL)
on the underlying set Z. Let P (U N ) and I(U N ) respectively denote the corresponding strict preference and indifference relations; in accordance with this notation, R(U N ) will sometimes be used to denote F (U N ).
It will be assumed throughout that the SWFL F satisfies the standard independence condition (I). This requires that whenever S ⊂ Z and the two utility function profiles
Arrow's impossibility and Roberts' weak neutrality theorems also rely on the Pareto condition (P), which requires that whenever a, b ∈ Z and
The strong neutrality result of d' Aspremont and Gevers (1977) makes use of the alternative Pareto indifference condition (P 0 ) requiring that a I(U N ) b whenever a, b ∈ Z and U N (a) = U N (b). Also, say that the SWFL F : D N → R(Z) satisfies the strict Pareto condition (P*) provided that, whenever a,
Given any individual i ∈ N and subset S ⊂ Z, let ψ(D i ) |S denote the set of restrictions to S of preference orderings ψ(U ) for some U ∈ D i . Then S ⊂ Z is said to be individually trivial (or trivial relative to D i ) if there exists i ∈ N such that #ψ(D i ) |S = 1. Hence, triviality requires there to be some individual with a unique preference relation R i|S = ψ(U i ) |S on S corresponding to every allowable utility function U i ∈ D i . In other words, the restriction to S of every U i ∈ D i must represent the same restricted preference ordering R i|S . Also, S ⊂ Z is said to be trivial (or trivial relative to D N ) if there exists i ∈ N such 4 We use the following notation for vector inequalities. Given any pair u N = u i i∈N and
Given any individual i ∈ N and any subset S ⊂ Z, let D i|S denote the set of restrictions to S of utility functions U i ∈ D i . Then S ⊂ Z is said to be individually utility free (or utility free relative to D i ) if D i|S = U(S). This requires every possible utility function on the set S to have an extension to some allowable function on Z that lies in the domain D i .
Equivalently, the domain condition U i ∈ D i must leave U i completely unrestricted on S.
The set S ⊂ Z is said to be utility free (relative to
Two non-trivial pairs { x, y } and { a, b } (with { x, y } = { a, b }) are said to be individually connected in D i (by individually utility free triples) if for some r = 3, 4, . . . there exists a chain { z k ∈ Z | k = 1, 2, . . . r } made up of r − 2 overlapping individually utility The domain D N of preference profiles is saturating if Z includes at least two non-trivial pairs, and if every non-trivial pair in Z is connected to every other non-trivial pair through utility free triples. In particular, the domain D N can be saturating only if Z contains at least one free triple. Note that the two non-trivial pairs must be different but may intersect.
The domain D N may be saturating, therefore, even if Z has only three members. Indeed, D N will be saturating if Z is a utility free triple. This is important because it shows that, when #Z ≥ 3, our main Theorems 1-3 for appropriate kinds of saturating domain have as corollaries the usual results for an unrestricted domain of utility functions.
As Result 3 in Section 4 below shows, the above saturating domain condition ensures that our theorems do apply to all non-trivial pairs. To include trivial pairs as well, we follow the usual practice of introducing stronger forms of saturation.
The domain D N is strongly saturating if it is saturating and also separable (cf. Kalai and Ritz, 1980) 
In fact, this last condition can be somewhat weakened for two of our results. Specifically, the domain D N is less strongly saturating if it is saturating, and also the above equations are required to hold only for λ = 0, implying thatŪ
Finally, the domain D N is ordinally strongly saturating if it is saturating and also, for every trivial pair { a, b } ⊂ Z, individual i ∈ N , and utility profile
, and
. Clearly, this is a different and major weakening of the strongly saturating domain condition.
Statement of the Main Theorems

Arrow's and Wilson's Theorems
The three main theorems set out in this section will be proved in the subsequent Section 4 via a series of intermediate Results.
Say that the SWFL F : D N → R(Z) satisfies the weak non-imposition condition (WNI) provided that, for every utility free set S ⊂ Z and every a, b ∈ S, there exists
This condition weakens Wilson's (1972) assumption by requiring non-imposition to hold only on utility free sets. This weakening seems appropriate when there is a restricted domain of preferences and utility profiles. Obviously, condition (WNI)
is a considerable weakening of the Pareto condition (P).
Following d 'Aspremont and Gevers (1977) and Roberts (1980) , say that the SWFL
are such that there exist additive constants α i and multiplicative constants ρ i > 0 for which
. As pointed out in the appendix, Sen's proof of Arrow's theorem for cardinal utility functions (see Sen, 1970, Theorem 8*2, pp. 129-30) shows that any SWFL satisfying both (I) and (CNC) must also satisfy (ONC). Also, as is well known, any SWFL satisfying (ONC) is effectively an Arrow social welfare function.
Given the SWFL F : D N → R(Z) and the set S ⊂ Z, say that there is universal indifference for S provided that, for all a, b ∈ S and U N ∈ D N , one has a I(U N ) b always.
Similarly, say that d ∈ N is a dictator for S if, for all a, b ∈ S and U N ∈ D N , one has
. When S = Z, simply say that there is universal indifference, or that d is a dictator or inverse dictator, without referring to Z explicitly.
Using condition (P) instead of (WNI), "Arrovian theorems" concerning the existence of a dictator have been proved for particular economic environments by Kalai, Muller and Satterthwaite (1979) , followed by Le Breton (1989, 1990a, b) . The following result represents a minor but useful generalization:
(WNI), and (CNC) on an ordinally strongly saturating domain D N . Then, unless there is universal indifference, there exists either a dictator or an inverse dictator.
The familiar anonymity condition (A) requires all individuals' preferences or utilities to be treated symmetrically; in particular, it excludes both a dictatorship and also an inverse dictatorship. The familiar neutrality condition (N), on the other hand, requires a symmetric treatment of all social states. More interesting in the context of this paper is the restricted neutrality condition (RN) requiring that (N) be satisfied by the restriction of the SWFL to any utility free set. Specifically, given any utility free set S, whenever the social states a, b, x, y ∈ S and the two utility function profiles
A corollary of Theorem 1 is the following result, which Hansson (1969) Proof: It is enough to prove that condition (RN) implies (WNI). So suppose that a, b ∈ S where S ⊂ Z is a utility free set. Suppose that a P (
holds.
Strong Welfarism
Given the SWFL F : D N → R(Z), say that the complete, reflexive and transitive binary relation on R N is a welfarist ordering if, for all a, b ∈ Z and U N ∈ D N , one has
Similarly, say that is a restricted welfarist ordering for S if the same property holds for This theorem can be used to show that many results such as those surveyed by d'Aspremont (1985) apply also to a less strongly saturating instead of an unrestricted domain of utility profiles -see also Weymark (1998) , Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998) , Bossert and Weymark (2004) .
5 If condition (RN) were replaced by the more demanding condition (N), then whenever D N allows the existence of at least one utility free triple, the Corollary would obviously follow from Wilson's original version of Theorem 1 which holds for an unrestricted domain. 6 Actually, instead of (P 0 ), d'Aspremont and Gevers assumed condition (P*) -which they called SP. However, it is easy to check that their proof of strong welfarism (on pp. 205-6) only uses conditions (U), (I) and (P 0 ), not (P*). Note that the proof in d' Aspremont and Gevers (1977) , like that in Hammond (1979 Hammond ( , p. 1129 , is actually incomplete because not every possible case is treated. The proof in d' Aspremont (1985) is complete, but seems to require a minor correction: the option e should be chosen so that b = e = d, otherwise it may be impossible to construct U 4 and U 5 as required when d = e. Sen (1977) has a complete but less concise proof of strong welfarism.
Roberts' Weak Welfarism Result
In order to derive our third result, based on Roberts (1980, Theorem 1, p. 428), we make use of the following pairwise continuity condition (PC):
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For every e 0 there exists e 0 with the property that, whenever the pair x, y ∈ Z and the profile
Say that the function W : R N → R is a (one way) Roberts social welfare function (or RSWF) if W is continuous and weakly monotone, 8 while for all a, b ∈ Z and U N ∈ D N , one has
In particular, W represents a weak welfarist preference ordering R * on the space R N whose corresponding strict preference relation P * has the property that, for all a, b ∈ Z and
Similarly, given any set S ⊂ Z, say that W |S : R N → R is a restricted RSWF for S if W |S is continuous and weakly monotone, while for all a, b ∈ S and U N ∈ D N , one has
After these necessary preliminaries, the following result extends Roberts' weak welfarism theorem to strongly saturating domains in the same way as Theorems 1 and 2 respectively extend Wilson's theorem and the strong welfarism theorem due to d'Aspremont and Gevers. 7 Actually, Roberts' theorem is incorrect as stated, but is easily corrected by using condition (PC) instead of weak continuity. See Hammond (1999) for details.
8 Say that the function W : R N → R is weakly monotone if, whenever u
It is worth noting that condition (PC) can be satisfied by utility function profiles satisfying five of the six comparability conditions summarized by Roberts (1980) -namely (ONC), (CNC), (OLC) (ordinal level comparability), (CUC) (cardinal unit comparability), and (CUC) (cardinal full comparability). But the sixth comparability condition -(CRS) (cardinal ratio scales) -violates condition (PC) unless the domain is restricted to positivevalued utilities, for which one can replace each U i (x) by log U i (x), or to negative-valued utilities, for which one can replace each
. Thus, Theorem 3 shows that, after correcting Roberts' Theorem by replacing condition (WC) with (PC), almost all his classification results apply to a strongly saturating as well as to an unrestricted domain of utility function profiles.
If (PC) is replaced by the more demanding condition (CNC), then Roberts (1980) shows that there must exist i ∈ N such that W (u N ) = u i . This shows the logical connection between: (i) Theorem 1 when (WNI) is strengthened to (P); (ii) Theorem 3 when (PC) is strengthened to (CNC). Proof: By condition (I), the restricted SWFL F |S : U N (S) → R(S) is well defined, and satisfies conditions (U) and (I) on the unrestricted domain U N (S) of all utility profiles defined on the utility free set S.
Proof of the Main Theorems
(a) Because F satisfies conditions (I), (WNI) and (CNC), its restriction F |S evidently satisfies the same three conditions on the free set S. But then the appendix shows that F |S satisfies (ONC) on S. Hence, F |S is equivalent to an Arrow social welfare function satisfying conditions (U), (I) and (WNI) on the unrestricted domain R N (S) of all preference profiles defined on the free set S. So Theorem 3 of Wilson (1972, p. 484) can be applied, which yields the stated result.
(b) If condition (P 0 ) is satisfied, then F |S also satisfies condition (P 0 ). So the strong neutrality theorem of d'Aspremont and Gevers can be applied to F |S , which yields the stated result.
(c) If conditions (P) and (PC) are satisfied, then F |S also satisfies conditions (P) and (PC). So Roberts' theorem can be applied to F |S , which yields the stated result.
A preference ordering R * on R N is said to be weakly monotone if
Claim. Suppose that R * 1 and R * 2 are continuous weakly monotonic preference orderings on
Proof: Suppose that R * 1 = R * 2 . After interchanging R * 1 and R * 2 if necessary, completeness of these two orderings implies that there exist u First, if there is universal indifference for T 1 , then a I(U N ) b for all U N ∈ D N . Because a, b ∈ T 2 and T 2 is a utility free triple, this excludes the possibility of there being either a dictator or an inverse dictator for T 2 . Hence, there must be universal indifference for T 2 as well, and so for
Because a, b ∈ T 2 and T 2 is a utility free triple, the only possibility allowed by Result 1 is that d is also a dictator for T 2 .
Because a, b ∈ T 2 and T 2 is a utility free triple, the only possibility allowed by Result 1 is that d is also an inverse dictator for T 2 .
(b) If condition (P 0 ) is satisfied, then Result 1 implies that there exist two welfarist orderings 1 and 2 for T 1 and T 2 respectively. Because T 1 and T 2 are free triples, for any pair Proof: Because the domain D N is saturating, there exist at least two non-trivial pairs { x, y } and { x , y } (with { x, y } = { x , y }). Moreover, because { x, y } and { x , y } are connected by a chain of free triples, there exists z ∈ Z such that T 1 := { x, y, z } is a free triple. This implies that Result 1 applies to T 1 , and also that { y, z } is a non-trivial pair.
Let { a, b } ⊂ Z be any non-trivial pair other than { x, y }. Because the domain D N is saturating, there exists a chain of overlapping utility free triples
(a) When conditions (WNI) and (CNC) are satisfied, Result 1 implies that for each triple T k (k = 1 to r), unless there is universal indifference for T k , there exists either a dictator or an inverse dictator d k for T k . By induction on k, Result 2 implies that unless there is universal indifference on every T k , there is either one common dictator or one common inverse dictator for every T k , including T r . Hence, for every non-trivial pair { a, b }, there must be either universal indifference, or the same dictator, or the same inverse dictator.
(b) If condition (P 0 ) is satisfied, then Result 1 implies that there exists a welfarist ordering for each triple T k (k = 1 to r). By Result 2, it follows by induction on k that these welfarist orderings are all the same. So there must exist some common welfarist ordering on R N which applies to every non-trivial pair.
(c) If conditions (P) and (PC) are satisfied, then Result 1 implies that there exists a restricted RSWF W |T k : R N → R for each triple T k (k = 1 to r). By Result 2, it follows by induction on k that the restricted RSWFs W |T k (k = 1 to r) all represent the same ordering on R N . Any one of these restricted RSWFs will serve as a common RSWF W : R N → R which applies to every non-trivial pair. 
In case there is a dictator d ∈ N for all non-trivial pairs, it follows that a P (Ū N ) c
In case there is an inverse dictator d ∈ N for all non-trivial pairs, a similar argument shows that c P (Ū N ) a and b P (Ū N ) c, implying that b P (Ū N ) a and so, by condition (I),
(b) If condition (P 0 ) is satisfied and the domain D N is less strongly saturating, there
be the welfarist ordering of Result 3, which applies to every non-trivial pair. In this case, our constructions imply that
a (using condition (P 0 ) and non-triviality of { b, c }) 
. But the domain D N is strongly saturating, so there must exist c ∈ Z andŪ N ∈ D N such that { a, c } and { b, c } are non-trivial pairs, whilē
Now the three main theorems of Section 3 are obvious implications of Results 3 and 4.
Economic Environments
Suppose that the space of economic allocations involves finite sets G of private goods and H of public goods, at least one of which is non-empty. Here, a good is considered public if and only if several different individuals share a legitimate concern in the quantity that is made available by the economic, political, and social system. Two important special cases considered in the previous literature are Case A when G = ∅ and so there are only public goods, or Case B when H = ∅ and so there are only private goods. The general or mixed Case C occurs when G = ∅ and H = ∅, so there are both public and private goods.
Although one can argue that this case has the most practical interest, so far only Bordes and Le Breton (1990a) have published results that concern it. 
Additional resource balance and production constraints will limit the economy's choices to a feasible subset of Z. Social choice theory, however, is concerned with the specification of a social welfare ordering over the whole underlying set Z.
Each individual i ∈ N is assumed to have some privately oriented utility function
any such utility function is independent of the allocation to all other individuals of their own private goods. Then for each individual i ∈ N , the domain of all possible privately oriented utility functions is
Assume that the restricted domain of each individual i ∈ N satisfies D i ⊂ U(Z i ), and that the different individuals' utility domains D i (i ∈ N ) are independently restricted in the sense that the restricted domain of allowable utility profiles is the Cartesian product set
In many economic contexts, each D i might consist of continuous (or smooth) and/or (strictly) quasi-concave utility functions defined on Z i . Each utility function may also satisfy suitable monotonicity properties. In particular, whenever (x i , y) (x i , y ) in the strict vector ordering on
, (x i , y ) } will be trivial for i whenever preferences are restricted to be weakly monotone.
Case A: Public Goods Only with a Common Utility Domain
This first case was originally considered by Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) . The underlying set Z is equal to Y , the domain of possible allocations of public goods.
In this case, our results use the following:
Domain Assumption (A). All individuals i ∈ N share a common saturating domain it is true as before without any need to assume a strongly saturating domain.
It remains to consider when Result 4 is true, since it applies to trivial pairs. Because D is a common saturating domain, if any pair a, b ∈ Y is trivial, then all individuals must have exactly the same preference over { a, b } -that is, either a P i b for all i ∈ N , or Proof: Because condition (P) is satisfied, on the trivial pair { a, b } it must be true that either
because, for a trivial pair { a, b }, it must be the case that
As for (b), when condition (P 0 ) is also satisfied, on the trivial pair { a, b } there are the following three possibilities:
and so, by (P 0 ), a I(U N ) b. It follows that, even for trivial pairs { a, b }, one must have
Combined with Result 3, it follows that when domain assumption (A) is satisfied, Theorems 1, 2 and 3 are all valid provided that the Pareto condition (P) is also imposed as an extra assumption. No form of strong saturation is required here.
Case B: Private Goods Only
In this case the underlying set Z = X N := i∈N X i , whose members are profiles of consumption vectors x N = (x i ) i∈N in the Cartesian product of different individuals' consumption sets X i . Also, each individual i's domain D i of allowable utility functions is some subset of the domain U(X i ) of all possible "selfish" utility functions U i (x i ) defined on X i .
Note that, because the sets U(X i ) are all different, so are the individuals' utility domains D i . This is unlike Case A which has only public goods and a common utility domain.
Even so, one can still consider an individually saturating domain of preferences D i on X i for every i ∈ N separately -i.e., a domain such that X i includes at least two To circumvent this problem, Bordes and Le Breton (1989) strengthen the assumption that there are individually saturating domains. They require instead that there are (individually) supersaturating domains. A natural adaptation of this assumption to utility domains requires these to be individually saturating domains with the additional property that:
For each individually non-trivial pair { a i , b i } ⊂ X i , there exists a disjoint non-trivial pair
Obviously this is satisfied whenever { a i , b i ,ã i ,b i } is a utility free quadruple, but our assumption is somewhat weaker.
The role of the supersaturation assumption is to allow different individuals' chains of connecting individually utility free triples to be extended until they all become equally long.
The assumption works by allowing any individual's non-trivial pair { a i , b i } to be connected to itself through either of the following two looped chains of free triples:
By adding enough of these looped chains of length three or four separately to each individual's connecting chain, all these chains can be made exactly the same length. In order to accommodate trivial pairs and so make Result 4 true in this case as well, Bordes and Le Breton (1989) introduce another strengthening of individual saturation, resulting in an (individually) hypersaturating domain. For the case of utility domains, hypersaturation requires that each D i be supersaturating, and also that, whenever
is an individually trivial pair and U i ∈ D i , there exists c i ∈ X i such that { a i , c i } and Under this assumption, clearly Theorems 1-3 all hold for a private good economy of the kind described above.
In fact, only Theorem 3 requires the full strength of hypersaturation. As in Section 3, Theorems 1 and 2 are still true under weaker versions of hypersaturation.
Specifically, the individual domain D i is ordinally hypersaturating if it is supersaturating and also, whenever { a i , b i } ⊂ X i is an individually trivial pair and
On the other hand, the individual domain D i is less hypersaturating if it is supersaturating and also, whenever { a i , b i } ⊂ X i is an individually trivial pair and U i ∈ D i , then there exist c i ∈ X i and a utility functionŪ i ∈ D i such that { a i , c i } and
Clearly, these last two definitions imply that if each individual domain D i is ordinally (resp. less) hypersaturating, then the Cartesian product domain D N is ordinally (resp. less) strongly saturating, so Theorem 1 (resp.Theorem 2) must hold.
As an example, suppose that X i = R G + where #G ≥ 2, and that all utility functions in D i are strictly increasing. If D i is sufficiently rich, it will obviously be supersaturating -for example, it is enough for D i to include all monotone strictly quasi-concave utility functions. Note, however, that { 0, x i } is a trivial pair whenever x i > 0. It is easy to check that this prevents each D i from being hypersaturating. Indeed, it cannot be ordinally or less hypersaturating either. In order to exclude a famous example due to Blau (1957) see also Border (1983) -one should consider X i = R G + \ {0} instead, on which the set of monotone utility functions is a hypersaturating domain, as is the set of monotone (strictly) quasi-concave utility functions. Accordingly, Theorems 1-3 all hold for this hypersaturating domain.
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10 See Campbell (1989a, b) for an exploration of the possible social welfare functions without interpersonal comparisons when 0 is retained in X i .
Case C: Mixed Public and Private Goods
This is the most interesting case, in which the underlying set is Z = X N × Y := i∈N X i × Y , whose members (x N , y) are profiles of consumption vectors x N = (x i ) i∈N in the Cartesian product of different individuals' consumption sets X i , combined with a public good vector y ∈ Y . Also, each individual i's restricted utility domain D i is a subset of the
In Case B we provided sufficient conditions to ensure that the product domain is strongly saturating, in the appropriate sense. In Case C, however, our sufficient conditions will not ensure this, as a later example will show.
Indeed, our domain assumptions seem natural adaptations of those used by Bordes and Le Breton (1990a) to define an "ultrasaturating" domain in which they prove Arrow's and related theorems. The assumptions are stated more easily if one begins by defining, for each y ∈ Y and each individual i ∈ N with utility domain D i , the conditional (on y) relative to the private component (or RPC) utility domain as Next, say that the set S ⊂ X i × Y is an RPC non-trivial pair (resp. an RPC utility free triple) for individual i if and only if the projection 
Here, assumption (C.1) is an obvious extension to utility domains of a combination of conditions (4), (5) and (7) in Bordes and Le Breton (1990a, p. 8) . Similarly, assumption (C.2) amounts to an obvious extension of a combination of their conditions (1) and (2).
It requires that, in order for the set S to be non-trivial (resp. utility free), it is sufficient (though not necessary) that S be non-trivial (resp. utility free) when only variations in private goods are considered. That leaves (C.3), which replaces their conditions (3) and (6) with one new assumption having much of the flavour of the separation condition that was introduced in Section 2. Condition (C.3) also plays a similar role to the extension from supersaturating to hypersaturating domains that was considered in Case B; however, because of its treatment of the public component, requiring in particular the existence of ā y ∈ Y which is independent of i, condition (C.3) is obviously stronger than merely requiring each RPC utility domain D * i to be hypersaturating on X i . Obvious weakenings of condition (C.3) would still allow Wilson's Theorem or strong welfarism to be proved, just as ordinal or less strong saturation was enough in Section 4.
Note that, whenever y ∈ Y and S i ⊂ X i is a non-trivial pair (resp. a utility free triple) relative to D * i , the set S i × {y} is an RPC non-trivial pair (resp. an RPC utility free triple). Because of (C.2), it follows that S i × {y} is also a non-trivial pair (resp. a utility free triple) relative to D i , and so S i is a non-trivial pair (resp. a utility free triple) relative to D An easier argument than that set out in Bordes and Le Breton (1990a, Section 6) establishes that all three assumptions (C.1)-(C.3) are satisfied in the "standard" case where, for all i ∈ N , the domain D i consists of all continuous, strictly increasing and quasi-concave utility functions on the familiar product space X i × Y with X i = R Second, every pair in X i × Y is evidently both utility free and RPC utility free. In particular, there are no trivial pairs or RPC trivial pairs. Also, for each y 1 , y 2 ,ȳ ∈ Y and x ∈ X, there existsx ∈ X \ { x, a } such that, given any U i ∈ D i and any λ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a utility functionŪ i ∈ D i satisfyinḡ
Note too that this is possible even when { (x, y 1 ), (x, y 2 ), (x,ȳ) } is not a free triple because x = a or y 1 = y 2 . This verifies condition (C.3).
Third, note that any triple T ⊂ X i × Y is utility free if and only it does not include the pair { (a, y ), (a, y ) } as a subset. This implies that neither domain D i is saturating because the free pair { (a, y ), (a, y ) } is not part of any utility free triple, and so cannot be linked to any of the other free pairs by a chain of utility free triples. On the other hand, any triple S ⊂ X i × Y is RPC utility free if and only if its projection onto X i is the triple 
